Web and Internet Economics [E-Book] : 11th International Conference, WINE 2015, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 9-12, 2015, Proceedings / edited by Evangelos Markakis, Guido Schäfer.
Markakis, Evangelos. (editor)
Schäfer, Guido. (editor)
1st ed. 2015.
Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer, 2015
XIX, 442 p. 34 illus. online resource.
englisch
9783662489956
10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6
Lecture notes in computer science ; 9470
Full Text
Table of Contents:
  • Sequential Posted Price Mechanisms with Correlated Valuations
  • Price Competition in Networked Markets: How Do Monopolies Impact Social Welfare
  • Computing Stable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing
  • The (Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments
  • Fast Convergence in the Double Oral Auction
  • Minority Becomes Majority in Social Networks
  • New Complexity Results and Algorithms for the Minimum Tollbooth Problem
  • Ad Exchange: Envy-free Auctions with Mediators
  • Computing Approximate Nash Equilibria in Network Congestion Games with Polynomially Decreasing Cost Functions
  • On Stackelberg Strategies in Affine Congestion Games
  • Impartial Selection and the Power of Up to Two Choices
  • Online Allocation and Pricing with Economies of Scale
  • Multilateral Deferred-Acceptance Mechanisms
  • Testing Consumer Rationality using Perfect Graphs and Oriented Discs
  • Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games
  • Welfare and Rationality Guarantees for the Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending Auction
  • Combinatorial Auctions with Conflict-Based Externalities
  • Applications of α-strongly Regular Distributions to Bayesian Auctions
  • The Curse of Sequentiality in Routing Games
  • Adaptive Rumor Spreading
  • Privacy and Truthful Equilibrium Selection for Aggregative Games
  • Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium
  • Often Harder Than in the Constructive Case: Destructive Bribery in CP-nets
  • Improving Selfish Routing for Risk-Averse Players
  • The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling
  • Incentivizing Exploration with Heterogeneous Value of Money
  • Bottleneck Routing with Elastic Demands
  • Mechanisms with Monitoring for Truthful RAM Allocation
  • Inverse Game Theory: Learning Utilities in Succinct Games
  • Query Complexity of Approximate Equilibria in Anonymous Games.