Central Control of Regional Budget [E-Book]: Theory with Applications to Russia / John Litwack
Litwack, John.
Paris : OECD Publishing, 2001
27 p. ; 21 x 29.7cm.
englisch
10.1787/560325048014
OECD Economics Department Working Papers ; 275
Economics
Russian Federation
Full Text
Motivated by the recent experience in the Russian Federation, this paper examines the implications of imposing central control on the budgetary activities of a subnational government. In a highly stylised multi-task principal-agent model (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991)), a central government cannot directly monitor the informal budgetary operations of a regional administration, but seeks to improve fiscal policies by exerting control over a "formal" regional budget and imposing (limited) costs on informal behaviour. In the static case of the model, the control of subnational budgetary operations by a benevolent central government may increase social welfare, but at the expense of higher (implicit and explicit) taxation of economic organisations in the region, lower output, and a strong orientation of informal policies toward rent seeking activities. The additional imposition of costs on regions for conducting informal budgetary operations has multiple (indeterminate) effects in ...