This title appears in the Scientific Report :
2023
Please use the identifier:
http://dx.doi.org/10.34734/FZJ-2023-01874 in citations.
Please use the identifier: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s43681-023-00273-w in citations.
Artificial intelligence, superefficiency and the end of work: a humanistic perspective on meaning in life
Artificial intelligence, superefficiency and the end of work: a humanistic perspective on meaning in life
How would it be assessed from an ethical point of view if human wage work were replaced by artificially intelligent systems (AI) in the course of an automation process? An answer to this question has been discussed above all under the aspects of individual well-being and social justice. Although the...
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Personal Name(s): | Knell, Sebastian |
---|---|
Rüther, Markus (Corresponding author) | |
Contributing Institute: |
Gehirn & Verhalten; INM-7 |
Published in: | AI and ethics, . (2023) S. . |
Imprint: |
[Cham]
Springer
2023
|
DOI: |
10.34734/FZJ-2023-01874 |
DOI: |
10.1007/s43681-023-00273-w |
Document Type: |
Journal Article |
Research Program: |
Neuroethics and Ethics of Information |
Link: |
OpenAccess |
Publikationsportal JuSER |
Please use the identifier: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s43681-023-00273-w in citations.
How would it be assessed from an ethical point of view if human wage work were replaced by artificially intelligent systems (AI) in the course of an automation process? An answer to this question has been discussed above all under the aspects of individual well-being and social justice. Although these perspectives are important, in this article, we approach the question from a different perspective: that of leading a meaningful life, as understood in analytical ethics on the basis of the so-called meaning-in-life debate. Our thesis here is that a life without wage work loses specific sources of meaning, but can still be sufficiently meaningful in certain other ways. Our starting point is John Danaher’s claim that ubiquitous automation inevitably leads to an achievement gap. Although we share this diagnosis, we reject his provocative solution according to which game-like virtual realities could be an adequate substitute source of meaning. Subsequently, we outline our own systematic alternative which we regard as a decidedly humanistic perspective. It focuses both on different kinds of social work and on rather passive forms of being related to meaningful contents. Finally, we go into the limits and unresolved points of our argumentation as part of an outlook, but we also try to defend its fundamental persuasiveness against a potential objection. |