This title appears in the Scientific Report :
2022
Please use the identifier:
http://dx.doi.org/10.3011/ESARDA.IJNSNP.2022.4 in citations.
Effort Bounded Inspections
Effort Bounded Inspections
Given an Inspectorate with the task of verifying the adherence of an Operator of a group of facilities to an agreement on permitted activities within those facilities, how large should the inspection effort be and how should it be distributed among the facilities? A game-theoretical approach is desc...
Saved in:
Personal Name(s): | Avenhaus |
---|---|
Krieger, Thomas (Corresponding author) / Canty | |
Contributing Institute: |
Nukleare Entsorgung; IEK-6 |
Published in: | ESARDA BULLETIN, 64 (2022) S. 39-47 |
Imprint: |
2022
|
DOI: |
10.3011/ESARDA.IJNSNP.2022.4 |
Document Type: |
Journal Article |
Research Program: |
Joint Programme on the Technical Development and Further Improvement of IAEA Safeguards between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the International Atomic Energy Agency Nuclear Waste Disposal |
Publikationsportal JuSER |
Given an Inspectorate with the task of verifying the adherence of an Operator of a group of facilities to an agreement on permitted activities within those facilities, how large should the inspection effort be and how should it be distributed among the facilities? A game-theoretical approach is described which addresses these important questions, generalizing and extending the applicability of earlier inspection models, which either treated inspection effort as extrinsic, or which imposed special assumptions. A solution of the inspection game, i.e., a Nash equilibrium, is presented in quite general terms, and two applications are presented. |